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a b s t r a c t
There is a considerable body of evidence showing that our preferences exhibit both refer-
ence dependence and loss aversion, a.k.a. the endowment effect. In this paper, we consider
the implications of the endowment effect for discounting, with a special focus on discounting
future improvements in the environment. We show that the endowment effect modiﬁes the
discount rate via (i) an instantaneous endowment effect and (ii) a reference-updating effect.
Moreoverwe show that these two effects often combine to dampen the preference to smooth
consumption over time. What this implies for discounting future environmental beneﬁts may
then depend critically on whether environmental quality is merely a factor of production of
material consumption, or whether it is an amenity. On an increasing path of material con-
sumption, dampened consumption smoothing implies a lower discount rate. But on a declin-
ing path of environmental quality and where we derive utility directly from environmental
quality, it implies a higher discount rate. On non-monotonic paths, loss aversion speciﬁcally
can give rise to substantial discontinuities in the discount rate.
© 2019 Published by Elsevier Inc.
“There is substantial evidence that initial entitlements do matter and that the rate of exchange between goods can
be quite different depending on which is acquired and which is given up” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991, p. 1039)
1. Introduction
The discounting debate is of enduring importance to environmental economics, because many investments in improving
environmental quality provide pay-offs far into the future. Numerous aspects of environmental discounting have been discussed
(e.g. Lind et al., 1982; Portney and Weyant, 1999; Gollier, 2012; Arrow et al., 2013). However, one that has been missing is the
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implications of the endowment effect.
In one of their classic experiments, Kahneman et al. (1990) endowed half of their subjects with a coffee mug and asked
them for the lowest price at which they would sell it. The other half were asked how much they would pay for the same mug.
Standard consumer theory would predict no difference between the selling and buying prices. However, subjects endowed with
the mug were prepared to sell for more than twice as much as the remaining subjects were willing to pay (also see Knetsch,
1989, 1992).1 Kahneman et al. therefore showed the initial endowment creates a reference point that matters, and in particular
losses are ascribed more value than equivalent gains, which has been termed the ‘endowment effect’ (Thaler, 1980). As well
as experiments, the endowment effect is consistent with a ubiquitous feature of contingent valuation studies into non-market
goods, whereby stated willingness to accept compensation exceeds willingness to pay (Horowitz and McConnell, 2002). It is
also consistent with studies of various sorts into status quo bias (e.g. Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988; Knetsch, 1989),2 and has
been demonstrated in ﬁeld studies (e.g. Genesove and Mayer, 2001).
There are basic reasons why the endowment effect modiﬁes the discount rate. The discount factor is the ratio of discounted
marginal utility in the future to marginal utility today. The endowment effect calls on us to recast what determines utility
by incorporating reference dependence and loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). Building on Bowman et al. (1999)
and Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), our formal model of the endowment effect proposes that utility is an additive combination
of standard ‘consumption-level’ utility and ‘gain/loss’ utility relative to a reference level, which depends on past consumption
levels. This means that, at the margin, there are two sides to the endowment effect. The ﬁrst is an ‘instantaneous endowment
effect’, which is just the marginal value of an instantaneous gain/loss in consumption from the reference level. The second is
a ‘reference-updating effect’, which is the marginal disvalue to forward-looking agents of increasing the reference level from
which future gains/losses are valued. Overall marginal utility becomes the sum of marginal consumption-level utility and this
marginal endowment effect, comprising the instantaneous endowment effect and the reference-updating effect. Loss aversion
implies both the instantaneous endowment effect and the reference-updating effect are larger for losses than gains.
At the heart of our results lies the fact that, in many situations, the rate at which the marginal endowment effect is changing
differs from the rate at which marginal consumption-level utility is changing. Take a rising consumption path. In the standard
model – sans endowment effect – marginal consumption-level utility falls along the path, as preferences for consumption are
gradually satiated. The consumption discount rate exceeds the pure time preference rate andwe smooth consumption by bring-
ing it forward to the relatively poor present. But, in some important cases, we ﬁnd that the marginal endowment effect falls
more slowly than marginal consumption-level utility, even not at all. Consequently the sum of marginal consumption-level
utility and the marginal endowment effect does not fall as fast, and the consumption discount rate is lower. We become more
patient. Conversely, on a falling consumption path, marginal consumption-level utility rises, the discount rate is lower than
the pure time preference rate and we postpone consumption to the relatively poor future. But, again, sometimes the marginal
endowment effect does not rise as fast, meaning the discount rate is higher. We become less patient.
Whether the marginal endowment effect falls more quickly or more slowly thanmarginal consumption-level utility depends
on the interplay between the instantaneous endowment effect and the reference-updating effect. The former essentially cap-
tures our becoming habituated to higher consumption levels (e.g. Constantinides, 1990; Campbell and Cochrane, 1999). Once we
become accustomed to a higher level of consumption, an extra unit is of similar value to an increment of consumption when we
were poor. However, we also anticipate becoming habituated to higher levels of consumption, which is the reference-updating
effect. This means habituation comes at a cost. In the cases just mentioned, it turns out that the instantaneous endowment
effect is higher than the reference-updating effect, but we also identify some opposing cases, where the endowment effect can
increase the discount rate on a positive growth path and decrease it on a negative growth path. We develop a suﬃcient statistic
entitled the ‘endowment factor’, which boils the endowment effect on the discount rate down to a single multiplying coeﬃcient.
In particular, taking the standard ‘Ramsey rule’ for discounting, we show that
r = Δ + 𝜃𝜂 ẋ
x
,
where 𝛿 is the pure time preference rate, 𝜂 is the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption (assumed constant), x˙∕x is the
growth rate of consumption and 𝜃 is the endowment factor. In the absence of the endowment effect, 𝜃 = 1. We would like to
know the sign and size of 𝜃. If consumption is increasing, the endowment effect decreases the discount rate provided 𝜃 < 1.
Conversely if 𝜃 > 1, the endowment effect increases the discount rate. If consumption is decreasing, 𝜃 has the opposite effect.
Loss aversion means that losses have greater (dis)value than gains at the margin. On some declining consumption paths, this
can result in the endowment effect having a greater impact on the discount rate. But perhaps the most striking effect of loss
aversion is on non-monotonic consumption paths. We examine a path in which consumption grows, then falls. Loss aversion
implies gain/loss utility is discontinuous when gains/losses become vanishingly small. When growth moves from positive to
negative territory, the instantaneous endowment effect thereby jumps. The reference-updating effect rises in anticipation of
this. The discount rate ﬁrst rises, then plummets, before eventually converging towards the rate in the standard model. Dis-
1 To allay concerns that the disparity could have been due to differences in wealth between subjects, Kahneman et al. (1990) conducted a further experiment,
in which, rather than being asked how much they would be willing to pay to buy the mug, subjects were given the option of being gifted the mug or a sum of
money, and asked at what value they would choose money over the mug. Those endowed with the mug were still prepared to sell for over twice as much as the
valuation put on the mug by those invited to choose.
2 Status quo bias can, of course, be explained in other ways, such as the existence of search and transaction costs.
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counted values can therefore be highly sensitive to the endowment effect in the region where growth switches sign, as this is
where the discount rate can diverge widely from its equivalent in the standard model.
What are the implications of the endowment effect for discounting projects to improve the future environment? We argue
the interpretation of our results depends importantly on whether environmental quality is a factor of production that enables
greater material consumption, or an amenity that directly contributes to utility. In the former case, we might usually expect
consumption to grow. Then if the endowment factor 𝜃 < 1, the discount rate is lower, we are more patient and we invest more
in the future environment. In the latter case, the literature on ‘dual discounting’ tells us that we should effectively discount the
returns on a project to improve environmental quality at the rate pertaining to environmental quality, notmaterial consumption
(Weikard and Zhu, 2005; Hoel and Sterner, 2007; Sterner and Persson, 2008; Traeger, 2011). If environmental quality is falling
and 𝜃 < 1, the discount rate is higher, we become less patient and paradoxically we are less likely to invest in the future
environment. The intuitive explanation is that we become habituated to lower environmental quality.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic elements of our model, shows how they affect
the discount rate and deﬁnes the endowment factor. Section 3 then attempts to establish the sign and size of this endowment
factor analytically on stylised growth paths. This theory is developed in the context of a generic consumption good. Section
4 offers an interpretation of the results by applying the theory to environmental discounting in both a single, material-good
setting and where there are two consumption goods, one of which is environmental quality. Section 5 explores some realistic,
but conceptually ambiguous, situations numerically, including the non-monotonic path described just above. Section 6 provides
a discussion, including the broader question of whether the endowment effect ought to be considered in evaluating public
environmental investments.
2. Basic theory
This paper is about discounting the future beneﬁts and costs of projects to improve the environment. These projects are
assumed to be marginal.3
2.1. Preferences
Welfare is discounted utilitarian,
J = ∫
∞
0
Ute
−Δtdt, (1)
where instantaneous utility is discounted at the constant rate 𝛿 > 0. Instantaneous utility depends on consumption of good
x ∈ [0,∞). But it does not just depend on the level of consumption of x, it also depends on the difference between the level of
consumption and a reference level. Our instantaneous utility function U ∶ + × →  is
U(xt, xt) =
Consumption−
level
utility
⏞⏞⏞
v
(
xt
)
+
Gain∕loss
utility
⏞⏞⏞ ⏞⏞
g
(
xt − xt
)
, (2)
where x is the reference level. Instantaneous utility therefore represents a mixed objective. The function v corresponds with the
standard theory of preferences, in that individual utility remains directly responsive to the absolute level of consumption. This
is what we refer to as consumption-level utility. We assume v is continuous, twice continuously differentiable, and that v′ > 0
and v″ < 0.
By contrast, the gain/loss function g captures the endowment effect. It is assumed to be continuous and twice continuously
differentiable except when xt − xt = 0. We impose three further behavioural restrictions on g, as a formal representation of the
famous value function in Kahneman and Tversky (1979).4 Let Δ ≡ xt − xt:
Assumption 1. [Bigger gains and smaller losses are weakly preferred] g′(Δ) ≥ 0.
Assumption 1 just ensures the gain/loss function is weakly increasing over its entire domain.
Assumption 2. [Loss aversion] If Δ > 0, then g′(−Δ) > g′(Δ).
Assumption 2 represents loss aversion with respect to both large changes in consumption and small ones. The former
property is of course shared with strictly concave consumption-level utility functions, but the latter property – speciﬁcally
lim
Δ→0
g′(−Δ)∕g′(Δ) > 1 – is a distinctive feature of the gain/loss function, which was made famous by Kahneman and Tversky
(1979).
3 See Dietz and Hepburn (2013) on discounting non-marginal environmental improvements.
4 Building on Bowman et al. (1999) and Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006).
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Assumption 3. [Non-increasing sensitivity] g
′′
(Δ) ≤ 0 for all Δ > 0, and g′′ (Δ) ≥ 0 for allΔ < 0.
Assumption 3 ensures the gain/loss function is weakly convex over the domain of losses andweakly concave over the domain
of gains. Diminishing sensitivity is required to represent a preference such as: “the difference between a yearly salary of $60,000
and a yearly salary of $70,000 has a bigger impact when current salary is $50,000 than when it is $40,000” (Tversky and Kahne-
man, 1991, p. 1048). Constant sensitivity implies the impact of the difference in salary does not depend on reference salary.
The reference level x depends on the history of consumption as in Ryder and Heal (1973):
x
t
= 𝛼 ∫
t
−∞
e−𝛼(t−𝜏)x𝜏d𝜏, (3)
where the parameter 𝛼 ∈ (0,∞) represents the responsiveness of the reference level to changes in the level of consumption
over time, i.e. it captures an individual’s memory for past consumption. The smaller is 𝛼, the longer that memory is. In the limit
as 𝛼 → 0 the current reference level corresponds to mean consumption over the entire history of consumption. At the other
extreme, as 𝛼 →∞ the current reference level is just consumption at the last instant. It is worth noting that there is empirical
support for the idea that a long history of consumption levels determines the reference level (Strahilevitz and Loewenstein,
1998). Combining (2) and (3) means preferences are inter-temporally dependent.
2.2. Discounting with the endowment effect
For an individual with preferences given by Equations (1)–(3), Appendix A shows that the marginal contribution to welfare
of x at time t is given by
Jxt = e
−Δt[v′(xt) +
Marginalendowment
effect
⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞ ⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞
Instantaneous
endowment
effect
⏞⏞⏞ ⏞⏞
g′
(
xt − xt
)
−
Reference − updating
effect
⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞ ⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞
𝛼 ∫
∞
𝜏=t
e−(𝛼+Δ)(𝜏−t)g′
(
x𝜏 − x𝜏
)
d𝜏], (4)
where the important feature is that Jxt is a functional derivative, i.e. given that preferences are inter-temporally dependent, it
describes the change in Jwith respect to a change in the consumption path.
As well as providing consumption-level utility v′, a unit of consumption at time t provides a contemporaneous gain, the
instantaneous endowment effect. In addition, a unit of consumption at time t affects the reference level from which gains are
evaluated after time t. This is the reference-updating effect. In evaluating investment projects, forward-looking individuals will
anticipate the effect that changes in consumption have on reference levels thereafter. The reference-updating effect is negative,
because an increase in consumption today raises future reference levels, and thereby reduces future gains in consumption, or
increases future losses. By how much an increase in consumption today raises future reference levels depends on the memory
parameter 𝛼, and what effect this in turn has onwelfare depends on the pure time discount rate 𝛿. Loss aversion implies both the
instantaneous endowment effect and the reference-updating effect will be higher on decreasing consumption paths, because g′
will be higher. We refer to the sum of the instantaneous endowment effect and the reference-updating effect as the marginal
endowment effect.
Using (4), the marginal rate of substitution between consumption at date 0 and date t, the discount factor, is
D(t, 0) ≡ Jxt∕Jx0 ,
= e−Δt
v′(xt) + g
′
(
xt − xt
)
− 𝛼 ∫ ∞𝜏=t e−(𝛼+Δ)(𝜏−t)g′
(
x𝜏 − x𝜏
)
d𝜏
v′(x0) + g
′
(
x0 − x0
)
− 𝛼 ∫ ∞𝜏=0 e−(𝛼+Δ)𝜏g′
(
x𝜏 − x𝜏
)
d𝜏
. (5)
From the discount factor we can derive an expression for the discount rate (see Appendix A):
r ≡ − d
dt
lnD(t, 0) = −
d
dt
Jx
Jx
,
= Δ −
v̇′ + ġ′ − 𝛼?̇?
v′ + g′ − 𝛼𝜇
, (6)
where 𝜇 is the shadow price of reference consumption:
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𝜇 = ∫
∞
𝜏=t
e−(𝛼+Δ)(𝜏−t)g′d𝜏. (7)
This is the marginal effect on welfare at time t of reducing the reference level, without changing the consumption path. Its time
derivative is ?̇? = g′ + (𝛼 + Δ) ∫ ∞
t
e−(𝛼+Δ)(𝜏−t)g′d𝜏 . Eq. (6) characterises the discount rate on an arbitrary consumption path.
Appendix B shows that it also characterises the discount rate on an optimal path, where 𝜇 is the negative of the costate variable
on reference consumption.
If we deﬁne the absolute value of the elasticity of consumption-level marginal utility as
𝜂 ≡ −v′′x
v′
,
then we obtain a more convenient and recognisable expression for r:
Definition 1. In the presence of the endowment effect as characterised by Eq. (2), the discount rate is
r = Δ + 𝜃𝜂 ẋ
x
, (8)
where the ‘endowment factor’ is
𝜃 =
1 +
ġ′
v̇′
−
𝛼?̇?
v̇′
1 +
g′
v′
−
𝛼𝜇
v′
. (9)
Equation (8) shows that the endowment effect modiﬁes the discount rate through the factor 𝜃.
3. The endowment factor on stylised growth paths
Given Deﬁnition 1, the crux of the paper is the question: what is the sign and size of the endowment factor 𝜃? This section
investigates the question in relation to some important, stylised trajectories for consumption of the good x. These trajectories
have a common feature, which is that marginal gain/loss utility changes at a constant rate k:
g′t = g
′
0
ekt. (10)
What kinds of path could be represented by (10)? Appendix C shows that, if the gain/loss function has a constant elasticity over
the appropriate domain of gains/losses, then paths with constant k correspond with paths with a constant rate of consumption
growth/decline. k = 0 can be a special case of this, where consumption is arithmetically increasing/decreasing, i.e. a linear
consumption trajectory. But k = 0 is also consistent with any strictly increasing/decreasing consumption path, if and only if
preferences obey constant sensitivity, i.e. g
′′
(Δ) = 0 for all Δ ≠ 0 (c.f. Assumption 3).
We can combine (10) with (9) to describe a functional relationship between 𝜃 and k,
𝜃 =
1 +
ġ′
v̇′
(
Δ−k
𝛼+Δ−k
)
1 +
g′
v′
(
Δ−k
𝛼+Δ−k
) . (11)
Below we investigate this functional relationship in detail. We can also rewrite the discount rate as a function of k,
r = Δ −
v̇′ + ġ′ −
(
𝛼
𝛼+Δ−k
)
ġ′
v′ + g′ −
(
𝛼
𝛼+Δ−k
)
g′
, (12)
which enables us to obtain a result that will be helpful in interpreting the analysis that follows.
Lemma 1. The reference-updating effect is a fixed proportion 𝛼∕ (𝛼 + Δ − k) of the instantaneous endowment effect if k is constant.
Lemma 1 implies that if 𝛿 > (<)k, the instantaneous endowment effect is larger (smaller) than the reference-updating effect
and therefore the marginal endowment effect is positive (negative).
3.1. Constant marginal gain/loss utility (k = 0)
First, consider the case where k = 0. Then
𝜃 = 1[
1 +
(
Δ
𝛼+Δ
)
g′
v′
] , (13)
and we can say:
Please cite this article as: Dietz, S., Venmans, F., The endowment effect, discounting and the environment, Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2019.01.010
S. Dietz and F. Venmans / Journal of Environmental Economics and Management xxx (xxxx) xxx6
Proposition 1. [The endowment effect dampens consumption smoothing if marginal gain/loss utility is constant] On an arithmeti-
cally increasing or decreasing consumption path, or on any strictly increasing/decreasing consumption path with constant sensitivity,
0 < 𝜃 < 1 if and only if 𝛿 > 0.
Proof . See Appendix D.
Standard consumption-level utility makes us want to smooth consumption between dates at which the level of consump-
tion is different. When consumption is increasing, marginal consumption-level utility falls. When consumption is decreasing,
marginal consumption-level utility rises. Therefore in a growing economy wewant to consume earlier by discounting the future
at a higher rate. Conversely when consumption is falling we want to postpone it to the future by discounting at a lower rate. All
of this is in the economist’s DNA.
Yet the endowment effect interferes with these preferences. Proposition 1 considers two situations in which marginal
gain/loss utility is constant. One is the behavioural assumption of constant sensitivity, allied with any strictly increas-
ing/decreasing consumption path. The other is diminishing sensitivity along an arithmetically increasing/decreasing consump-
tion path, because the linearity of the consumption trajectory ensures k = 0. If marginal gain/loss utility is constant, then both
the instantaneous endowment effect and the reference-updating effect are constant, and so is the marginal endowment effect,
i.e. the sum of the two. Moreover Lemma 1 implies that when 𝛿 > k = 0, the instantaneous endowment effect is larger than
the reference-updating effect and the marginal endowment effect is not only constant, it is positive. Since overall marginal util-
ity is the sum of marginal consumption-level utility and the marginal endowment effect, the endowment effect causes overall
marginal utility to decrease at a slower rate on an increasing path, and increase at a slower rate on a decreasing path. In other
words, the endowment effect reduces the discount rate r on an increasing path, while it raises r on a decreasing path.
Positive pure time preference, however small, is an uncontroversial assumption. Even if the view is taken that the discount
rate is derived from a social welfare functional and it should be impartial to the date at which utility is enjoyed, (very) small pos-
itive utility discounting still follows from taking into account the probability of extinction of society (e.g. Stern, 2007; Llavador
et al., 2015). Therefore this result arguably has quite wide applicability.
3.2. Non-constant marginal gain/loss utility (k ≠ 0)
Diminishing sensitivity implies marginal gain/loss utility falls, the larger is the gain/loss. On convex increasing and concave
decreasing consumption paths, gains and losses respectively grow ever larger, so k < 0. By contrast, on concave increasing and
convex decreasing consumption paths, gains and losses respectively grow ever smaller, so k > 0.
Strictly increasing consumption paths
Fig. 1 plots 𝜃 as a function of k on strictly increasing consumption paths. We always assume 𝛿 > 0. Looking ﬁrst at convex
increasing paths, the following Proposition is established:
Proposition 2. [The endowment factor on convex increasing paths] When consumption is strictly increasing and k< 0,
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
0 < 𝜃 ≤ 1 ⟺ k ≥ v̇′
v′
𝜃 ≥ 1 ⟺ k ≤ v̇′
v′
.
On a convex increasing path, gains grow over time, hence g′ falls over time and so do both the instantaneous endowment
effect and the reference-updating effect. We know from Lemma 1 that the latter is a ﬁxed fraction of the former. Moreover
along a convex increasing consumption path k < 0, so the reference-updating effect is always smaller than the instantaneous
endowment effect. This means the marginal endowment effect is positive and falls along the path.
What then becomes crucial is the relationship between the rate of decrease of marginal gain/loss utility, k, and the rate of
decrease of marginal consumption-level utility, v̇′∕v′. When k > v̇′∕v′, marginal gain/loss utility falls more slowly thanmarginal
consumption-level utility, hence overall marginal utility does not fall as quickly as it would otherwise do and 0 < 𝜃 < 1.
The discount rate is consequently lower. By contrast, when k < v̇′∕v′, marginal gain/loss utility falls faster than marginal
consumption-level utility, overall marginal utility falls more quickly than it would otherwise do and our preference to bring
consumption forward is ampliﬁed, increasing the discount rate (𝜃 > 1).
On a concave increasing path, the sign of 𝜃 is ambiguous:
Proposition 3. [The endowment factor on concave increasing paths] When consumption is strictly increasing and k > 0,
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
0 < 𝜃 ≤ 1 ⟺ k ≤ Δ
𝜃 ≥ 1 ⟺ Δ ≤ k < Δ + 𝛼∕ (1 + g′∕v′)
𝜃 < 0 ⟺ k > Δ + 𝛼∕
(
1 + g′∕v′
) .
The reference-updating effect is increasing in k. If k < 𝛿, the instantaneous endowment effect is larger than the reference-
updating effect according to Lemma 1, which means that the marginal endowment effect is positive overall and this time it is
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Fig. 1. The endowment factor as a function of k on strictly increasing consumption paths.
increasing. This gives us another case in which 0 < 𝜃 < 1. If k > 𝛿, the reference-updating effect is larger than the instanta-
neous endowment effect, which means that the marginal endowment effect is negative and increasing. This increases the dis-
count rate, because the rate at which overall marginal utility falls is ampliﬁed (𝜃 > 1). In the limit as k → Δ + 𝛼∕
(
1 + g′∕v′
)
,
𝜃 becomes unbounded. This is because the reference-updating effect fully cancels out the sum of marginal consumption-level
utility and the instantaneous endowment effect, overall marginal utility is zero and the discount rate explodes. To the right of
the asymptote, the reference-updating effect is larger than the sum ofmarginal consumption-level utility and the instantaneous
endowment effect, overall marginal utility is negative and 𝜃 < 0.
Strictly decreasing consumption paths
Figs. 2 and 3 plot 𝜃 as a function of k on strictly decreasing consumption paths. The rate of decrease of consumption
turns out to matter here, because the limit behaviour of 𝜃 in the region of the vertical asymptote depends on whether
Δ + 𝛼∕
(
1 + g′∕v′
)
< (>)v̇′∕v′. Fig. 2 depicts a setting of rapidly decreasing consumption, deﬁned as v̇′∕v′ > Δ + 𝛼∕
(
1 + g′∕v′
)
.
By contrast, Fig. 3 depicts the opposite setting of slowly decreasing consumption, where v̇′∕v′ < Δ + 𝛼∕
(
1 + g′∕v′
)
.5
Looking ﬁrst at concave decreasing paths, the following Proposition is plain to see:
Proposition 4. [The endowment factor is less than unity on concave decreasing consumption paths] 𝜃 < 1 if consumption is strictly
decreasing and k < 0.
The preference to smooth consumption, in this case by postponing it, is also dampened on concave decreasing consumption
paths. Indeed, if marginal gain/loss utility falls quickly enough, the endowment effect can actually reverse the preference to
postpone consumption (although whether the discount rate changes sign depends on 𝛿).6
An intuitive explanation for Proposition 4 draws once again on Lemma 1, which says that the reference-updating effect falls
as a ﬁxed proportion of the instantaneous endowment effect. The case of concave decreasing consumption is also one where
the reference-updating effect is the smaller of the two effects (k < 0). On a concave decreasing consumption path, marginal
consumption-level utility is increasing. On the other hand, the marginal endowment effect is positive and decreasing, so overall
marginal utility increases more slowly. The effect could be suﬃciently large that overall marginal utility itself is decreasing
overall.
On a convex decreasing path, diminishing sensitivity instead results in an increase in marginal gain/loss utility over time.
The instantaneous endowment and reference-updating effects grow in step with each other as will be familiar by now, but of
course when k > 0 it is no longer assured that the reference-updating effect is smaller than the instantaneous endowment
effect. It will be the case if k < 𝛿, a situation in which consumption decreases relatively slowly. If, in addition to this, k < v̇′∕v′,
5 Note the exact placement of v̇′∕v′ on the Figures is arbitrary; we only know where it lies in relation to Δ + 𝛼∕
(
1 + g′∕v′
)
. This affects the strength of the
conclusions we can draw.
6 Note that θ = 0 when k = Δ +
𝛼
1+ ̇g′∕v̇′
.
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Fig. 2. The endowment factor as a function of k on strictly decreasing consumption paths, where v̇′∕v′ > Δ + 𝛼∕ (1 + g′∕v′).
Fig. 3. The endowment factor as a function of k on strictly decreasing consumption paths, where v̇′∕v′ < Δ + 𝛼∕ (1 + g′∕v′).
0 < 𝜃 < 1 and the discount rate increases:
Proposition 5. [On convex decreasing paths, the endowment effect dampens consumption smoothing if marginal gain/loss utility
increases at a slower rate than pure time preference or marginal consumption-level utility, whichever is smaller] When consumption
is strictly decreasing and k > 0, 0 < 𝜃 < 1 if k < Δ < v̇′∕v′.
If k > 𝛿 – consumption is decreasing more rapidly – the reference-updating effect is larger than the instantaneous endow-
ment effect. As the Figures show, this can result in 𝜃 > 1, but the picture is complicated by the asymptotic behaviour of 𝜃,
which depends on how rapidly consumption is falling.
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3.3. 𝜃 in the long run
Although this analysis has been based on the assumption that k is constant over time, 𝜃 changes over time, because it depends
on the evolution of v′ and g′. As we show in Appendix E, in general either v′ or g′ comes to dominate in the long run. That is,
either marginal consumption-level utility or the marginal endowment effect dominates in the long run, which enables us to
establish some further useful results on the value of 𝜃.
4. Discounting environmental projects
In order to interpret these analytical results in the context of discounting environmental projects, it is necessary to discuss
what the appropriate discounting concept is.
4.1. Single-good setting
Suppose that the environment is a factor of production of material goods, but it does not directly affect utility. Then it is
appropriate to discount environmental beneﬁts in the future at the rate pertaining to consumption of material goods, C. This is
a straightforward application of the theory above. Substituting C for x, the ‘material discount rate’ is
rC = Δ + 𝜃C𝜂CC Ċ
C
,
where 𝜂CC ≡ −v′′C∕v′ and the ‘material endowment factor’ is
𝜃C =
1 +
ġ′
v̇′
−
𝛼?̇?
v̇′
1 +
g′
v′
−
𝛼𝜇
v′
.
Consumption of material goods is usually increasing. Propositions 1, 2, 3 showed that, when this is so, the endowment effect
often reduces the material discount rate, because 𝜃 < 1. Consequently our willingness to pay to provide future environmental
improvements is increased. Important cases include, ﬁrst, arithmetic growth (Proposition 1) and, second, exponential growth
when either there is constant sensitivity with respect to gain utility (Proposition 1), or marginal gain/loss utility falls more
slowly than marginal consumption-level utility (Proposition 2). The environmental production factor should of course be priced
at its future marginal productivity, which may be higher, but this is unrelated to the endowment effect.
4.2. Two-good setting
Now suppose that, in addition to the composite produced good C, instantaneous utility also depends on the quality of the nat-
ural environment E. Preferences are a minimal extension of the single-good setting. The welfare functional remains discounted
utilitarian as in (1). The instantaneous utility function U ∶ 2 ×2
+
→  in period t is now
Ut(Ct, Ct, Et, Et) = v
(
Ct , Et
)
+ g
(
Ct − Ct
)
+ h
(
Et − Et
)
, (14)
where E is the reference level of environmental quality.
We assume that the consumption-level utility function v is concave increasing in both material consumption and environ-
mental quality. No restriction is placed on vCE, i.e. the cross partial derivative. The gain/loss function h captures the endowment
effect with respect to environmental quality. It is conditioned by the same assumptions as the gain/loss function with respect
to the produced good g. By virtue of the additive way in which reference dependence enters the utility function, g′ is assumed
independent of the level or change in E, and h′ is likewise assumed independent of the level or change in C.
We assume E evolves in just the same way as the reference level of material consumption, i.e.
E
t
= 𝛼 ∫
t
−∞
e−𝛼(t−𝜏)E𝜏d𝜏, (15)
with the memory parameter 𝛼 common to the evolution of both reference levels.
Following the same procedure as above, the environmental discount rate
rE = Δ −
v̇E+ ḣ
′ − 𝛼?̇?
vE + h
′ − 𝛼𝜙
, (16)
where the shadow price of reference environmental quality is
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𝜙 = ∫
∞
𝜏=t
e−(𝛼+Δ)(𝜏−t)h′d𝜏. (17)
Appendix B shows how the environmental discount rate rE can be derived from an optimal control problem, in which environ-
mental degradation has either a ﬂow or stock character.
Substitute v̇E = vEEĖ + vEC Ċ into (16) and deﬁne 𝜂EE as the elasticity of consumption-level marginal utility of environmental
quality with respect to environmental quality,
𝜂EE ≡ −vEEE
vE
,
and 𝜂EC as the elasticity of consumption-level marginal utility of environmental quality with respect to consumption of material
goods,
𝜂EC ≡ vECC
vE
.
In the presence of the endowment effect as characterised by Eq. (2), the environmental discount rate is
rE = Δ + 𝜃E
(
𝜂EE Ė
E
− 𝜂EC Ċ
C
)
(18)
where the ‘environmental endowment factor’ is
𝜃E =
1 +
ḣ′
v̇E
−
𝛼?̇?
v̇E
1 +
h′
vE
−
𝛼𝜙
vE
. (19)
When it comes to trading off consumption of the produced good at date 0 with environmental quality at date t (or vice versa),
this can be achieved in two ways, with identical results (Weikard and Zhu, 2005; Hoel and Sterner, 2007). Deﬁne the relative
price of environmental quality at date t as pt ≡ JEt∕JCt . Then expand the term p˙∕p, the change in the relative price, to get
ṗ
p
≡
d
dt
(JE∕JC)
JE∕JC
=
v̇E+ ḣ
′ − 𝛼?̇?
vE + h
′ − 𝛼𝜙
−
v̇C+ ġ
′ − 𝛼?̇?
vC + g
′ − 𝛼𝜇
= 𝜃E(𝜂EC Ċ
C
− 𝜂EE Ė
E
) − 𝜃C(𝜂CE Ė
E
− 𝜂CC Ċ
C
)
= rC − rE,
(20)
where 𝜂CE is the elasticity of consumption-level marginal utility of material goods with respect to environmental quality.
In the two-good setting, the material discount rate is not the appropriate discount rate for future environmental beneﬁts,
unless it is adjusted for changes in relative prices, rE = rC − p˙∕p (Weikard and Zhu, 2005; Hoel and Sterner, 2007; Sterner
and Persson, 2008; Traeger, 2011). Alternatively one can calculate the present value of environmental quality enjoyed at date t
using rE and then convert this into units of the produced good using the present relative price p0. If we are in a setting where
environmental quality is declining while consumption of material goods is increasing, 𝜂EE · Ė∕E < 0, which will reduce the
discount rate. The sign of 𝜂EC · Ċ∕C is ambiguous a priori, but ordinarily we would expect 𝜂EC > 0 so that, as environmental
quality becomes relatively more scarce, the environmental discount rate is lower still (Hoel and Sterner, 2007; Traeger, 2011).
Parallel to the analysis of the single-good case, the endowment effect enters via the environmental endowment factor 𝜃E.
When environmental quality is on a decreasing path, the endowment effect increases the environmental discount rate rE if
𝜃E < 1. Proposition 4 showed that 𝜃E < 1 on concave decreasing consumption paths. Such pathsmight be of particular relevance
to environmental discounting. For instance, in their exploration of the concept of the ‘Anthropocene’, Steffen et al. (2011) plotted
the evolution of 12 global environmental indicators, ranging from the atmospheric stock of greenhouse gases and ozone, to the
depletion of ﬁsheries, forests and biological diversity. They showed that in all of the aforementioned cases environmental quality
has been on a concave decreasing path since the beginning of the industrial revolution, branding the last 70 years in particular
the ‘Great Acceleration’.7
If 𝜃E < 1, our willingness to pay to provide future environmental improvements may be reduced. However, it is not as clear
as in the single-good setting. Not only does the endowment effect impact the discount rate in the two-good setting, it also
impacts the initial accounting price p0 ≡ JE0∕JC0 . Nonetheless we can say that for long-run investments in the environment, the
effect of 𝜃E on rE will dominate, and vice versa for short-run investments.
7 Where environmental quality is the inverse of the stock of pollution (carbon dioxide and ozone), the stock of pollution has increased exponentially. The
percentage of global ﬁsheries fully exploited, and the percentage of global forest cover destroyed since 1700, have both increased exponentially. The rate of
species extinctions has increased exponentially, with approximately no species additions. See Steffen et al. (2011), Fig. 1.
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5. Numerical illustrations
Some numerical examples will be helpful at this point. They will enable us to quantify the endowment effect on the discount
rate. We can also inspect cases similar to those above, where the sign and size of the endowment factor were found to be
conceptually ambiguous. Finally, we can look at non-monotonic growth paths, where not only reference dependence but also
loss aversion plays a prominent role.
5.1. Functional forms and parameter scheme
In the single-good setting, we specify a consumption-level utility function that is isoelastic, i.e.
v(Ct) =
1
1 − 𝜓
C
1−𝜓
t
, (21)
where 𝜓 > 0 is the elasticity of marginal consumption-level utility. In the two-good setting, we combine this assumption of
a constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution with a constant elasticity of substitution between the produced good and
environmental quality (like Hoel and Sterner, 2007; Traeger, 2011):
v(Ct , Et) =
1
1 − 𝜓
[
𝛾C1−1∕𝜎
t
+ (1 − 𝛾) E1−1∕𝜎t
] (1−𝜓)𝜎
𝜎−1 , (22)
where 𝜎 is the elasticity of substitution between the two goods.
For gain/loss utility we use a generalisation of the functional form proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), which is
consistent with Assumptions 1, 2, 3:
g(Δ), h(Δ) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
(Δ + 𝜔)𝛽 −𝜔𝛽 , Δ ≥ 0
−𝜆((−Δ + 𝜔)𝛽 −𝜔𝛽 ), Δ < 0
, (23)
where 𝛽 ∈ (0, 1] and 𝜆 ≥ 1. Compared with Tversky and Kahneman (1992), we introduce the parameter 𝜔 > 0 to ensure
marginal gain/loss utility is bounded from above as Δ → 0 in the limit.8 The parameter 𝜔 enters twice in order to also satisfy
the property that g(0) = h(0) = 0. Bounding marginal gain/loss utility becomes important when we consider non-monotonic
paths later in this section. It does mean that the gain/loss functions exhibit a non-constant elasticity, which in turn means that
k is not constant, but for Δ ≫ 0 it will be approximately constant.
In the single-good setting, a weighted sum of (21) and (23) makes up the instantaneous utility function. Assuming consump-
tion is increasing, this would be written as
Ut(Ct, Ct) =
𝜁
1 −𝜓
C
1−𝜓
t
+ (1 − 𝜁 )
[(
Ct − Ct +𝜔
)𝛽
−𝜔𝛽
]
. (24)
The parameter 𝜁 ∈ [0, 1] governs the value share of consumption-level utility. In order to calibrate 𝜁 , we target the initial value
share of consumption-level utility, Z:
Z ≈
𝜁v′
0
C0
𝜁v′
0
C0 + (1 − 𝜁 )g′
(
C0 − C0
) .
In the two-good setting, the value share of the produced good relative to environmental quality is determined by 𝛾 ∈ [0, 1).
Assuming consumption of the produced good is increasing and environmental quality is falling, the instantaneous utility func-
tion would be written as
Ut(Ct, Ct, Et, Et) =
𝜁
1 − 𝜓
[𝛾C1−1∕𝜎
t
+ (1 − 𝛾)E1−1∕𝜎
t
]
(1−𝜓)𝜎
𝜎−1
+(1 − 𝜁 )𝛾[(Ct − Ct + 𝜔)
𝛽 − 𝜔𝛽 ]
−(1 − 𝜁 )(1− 𝛾)𝜆[(−Et + Et + 𝜔)
𝛽 − 𝜔𝛽 ].
In order to calibrate 𝛾 , we target the initial value share of the produced good, Γ:
Γ ≈
𝜁vC0C0 + (1 − 𝜁 )g
′
(
C0 − C0
)
𝜁 (vC0C0 + vE0E0) + (1 − 𝜁 )
[
g′
(
C0 − C0
)
+ h′
(
E0 − E0
)] .
8 In a similar fashion to the bounding parameter in harmonic absolute risk aversion (HARA) functions (Gollier, 2001).
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Table 1
Default parameter values.
Parameter Value
Z 0.75
Γ 0.9
𝜓 1.5
𝜎 0.5
𝛽 0.9
𝜆 2.25
𝛿 1.5%
𝛼 0.5
𝜔 $1
Fig. 4. Material discount rates with and without the endowment effect.
For numerical modelling it is natural to work in discrete time and in discrete time the reference levels form according to
C
t
= (1 − 𝛼)C
t−1
+ 𝛼Ct−1,
E
t
= (1 − 𝛼)E
t−1
+ 𝛼Et−1,
where 𝛼 ∈ [0, 1] and t stands for one year. This is particularly convenient to interpret, because 𝛼 = 1 implies that the current
reference level is exactly the last period’s consumption level, 𝛼 = 0 implies that the current reference level is exactly the initial,
exogenous reference level, and 𝛼 = 0.5 is exactly the intermediate case. We initialise the model 20 years in the past, so that by
the time our discounting analysis begins (at t = 0), consistent reference consumption levels have formed.
Table 1 lists the default parameter values chosen for all of our numerical modelling. We choose typical values from empirical
studies for the elasticity of marginal utility 𝜙 = 1.5 and the parameters of the gain/loss function; 𝛽 = 0.9 and 𝜆 = 2.25
(Barberis, 2013). Choosing the pure rate of time preference 𝛿 is particularly controversial: we opt for 1.5% here. We choose a
middle-of-the-road value of 𝛼 = 0.5. Γ and Z are hard to pin down with empirical evidence, so we conservatively set Γ = 0.9
and Z = 0.75.
5.2. Single-good setting
Fig. 4 plots the time-averaged discount rate9 in an illustration, in which annual consumption per capita grows at 1.5% per
annum. This is the growth rate of global average household ﬁnal consumption expenditure per capita over the last 30 years.10
Discount rates with and without the endowment effect are shown.
Without the endowment effect, it is well known that the discount rate ‘rCstd.’ is given by the Ramsey rule; rC = 𝛿 + 𝜙 · Ċ∕C,
so 1.5 + 1.5∗1.5 = 3.75%.11 But, when the endowment effect is present, the discount rate ‘rCendow.’ is initially just 2.18%, and
falls further to 1.94% in 100 years. Therefore the endowment effect makes a big difference in this empirically plausible example,
resulting in a much more patient decision-maker who would be willing to pay more to improve the environment in the future,
9 That is, the average rate of fall of the discount factor from time 0 to t.
10 The initial value, which is also the reference value, is $3467. Both of these data points are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
11 Technically the Ramsey rule will only be an approximation with a discrete time step; actually rCstd. = 3.79%.
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Fig. 5. Discount rates with and without the endowment effect.
in a single-good setting.
Since rCendow. is lower than rCstd. and falling relative to it, the material endowment factor 0 < 𝜃C < 1 and ̇𝜃C < 0. Indeed
𝜃C is initially 0.3 and it falls to 0.18 in 100 years. Consumption of the produced good is on a convex increasing path, so the
implication is that we have an example here that is similar to v̇′∕v′ < k < 0 above (Fig. 1 and Proposition 2). marginal gain/loss
utility falls slowly enough that the endowment effect dampens our preference to smooth consumption of the produced good.
Appendix G presents a sensitivity analysis of 𝜃C to variation in the preference parameters.
5.3. Two-good setting
Fig. 5 plots the time-averaged environmental discount rate that results when annual material consumption per capita grows
at 1.5% per year, as above, and when environmental quality falls at 0.5% per year. Environmental quality is hence on a convex
decreasing path, which was a conceptually ambiguous case in Section 3.
Without the endowment effect, the average environmental discount rate ‘rEstd.’ begins at −0.1% and nudges upwards to
0.09% in 100 years. If Ut(Et) = 1∕1 − 𝜙E
1−𝜙
t
, then according to the Ramsey rule the environmental discount rate would be
1.5 + 1.5∗ − 0.5 = 0.75%, so the effect of including consumption-level utility from the produced good, −𝜂ECĊ∕C, is to pull the
discount rate on environmental quality signiﬁcantly downwards. Increases in environmental quality are more valuable when
the produced good is relatively abundant; the relative prices story. For this to be the case, it must be that 𝜂EC > 0, which can be
veriﬁed for our parameter scheme.12
When the endowment effect is present, the average environmental discount rate ‘rEendow.’ starts at 1.16% and falls to 1.03%
in 100 years, so the endowment effect does indeed increase the rate at whichwewould discount an environmental project, when
environmental quality directly enters our utility function. The environmental endowment factor 0 < 𝜃E < 1, which implies
the growth rate of marginal gain/loss utility is less than the pure rate of time preference, similar to the case highlighted in
Proposition 5.13 Initially 𝜃E = 0.21, while after 100 years it is 0.34.
Appendix G also presents a sensitivity analysis of 𝜃E to variation in the preference parameters.
5.4. A non-monotonic path for environmental quality
Thus far the analysis has been entirely based on consumption trajectories that are strictly increasing/decreasing. Here we
focus on an alternative path of environmental quality, whereby the initial growth rate is 0.5%, but the growth rate falls by 0.01
percentage points per year. Consequently environmental quality grows for the ﬁrst thirty years, and then falls.
Since the average growth rate of environmental quality declines, so does rEstd. (Fig. 6). By contrast, rEendow. follows a non-
monotonic and discontinuous path. As t → 30, it increases sharply to nearly 6%, before suddenly dropping far below 0%, and then
increasing again to become close to rEstd.. Loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity are the causes of this striking behaviour.
As t → 30, gains become ever smaller. Due to diminishing sensitivity, marginal gain/loss utility increases and it does so more
than proportionally. This increases both the instantaneous endowment effect and the reference-updating effect. In this case, the
12 In particular, given (22).
𝜂EC = (𝛾 − 1)(𝜙+ 𝜌 − 1)E
𝜌
[𝛾C𝜌 + (1 − 𝛾) E𝜌]
,
where ρ = 1 − 1∕σ. Hence ηEC > 0 ⇔ (γ − 1)(ϕ + ρ − 1) > 0.
13 Indeed marginal gain/loss utility g′ grows at only about 0.04% per year.
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Fig. 6. The environmental discount rate when E follows an inverse-U shaped path.
latter effect is dominating the former andmarginal utility falls faster than in the standardmodel. Indeed, the reference-updating
effect is so large that the discount factor becomes negative as t gets close to 30. Hence the discount rate rises steeply to a peak
(which is regulated by the bounding parameter𝜔).
At exactly t = 30, very small gains turn into very small losses. Due to the discontinuity in the gain/loss function, marginal
gain/loss utility, which was already very high, jumps even higher. Accordingly, the discount factor jumps up to a large positive
value and rEendow. jumps down to a very low trough. Thereafter losses become ever larger, marginal gain/loss utility falls and
rEendow. becomes closer to rEstd. again. Appendix H isolates the different effects of loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity by
exploring various combinations of the loss aversion parameter 𝜆 and the elasticity of the gain/loss function 𝛽 .
6. Discussion
Our analysis has shown that the endowment effect can make a substantial difference to the discount rate. In particular, we
have shown that in many cases the endowment effect dampens our preference to smooth consumption over time, or indeed
goes as far as reversing it. This is formalised in the idea that the endowment factor 𝜃 < 1. In summary, we have found that
𝜃 < 1 in at least the following cases:
1. If gain/loss utility conforms to constant sensitivity (Proposition 1);
2. If consumption is arithmetically increasing or decreasing (Proposition 1);
3. If consumption is convex increasing such that marginal gain/loss utility is decreasing at a constant rate k, and k is greater
than the rate of change of marginal consumption-level utility (Proposition 2 and Section 5.2);
4. If consumption is concave increasing and k < 𝛿 or k > Δ + 𝛼∕
(
1 + g′∕v′
)
(Proposition 3);
5. If consumption is concave decreasing (Proposition 4).
6. If consumption is convex decreasing and k < Δ < v̇′∕v′ (Proposition 5 and Section 5.3).
We have also shown that the implications of this result may differ fundamentally, depending on whether the environment
is simply a factor of production of material goods, or has amenity value and directly enters the utility function. In the former
case, it is appropriate to discount improvements in the future environment at the material discount rate. Assuming material
consumption is increasing, the preference to smooth consumption between dates contributes positively to the discount rate.
That 𝜃 < 1 makes us more patient if this is so. In the latter case, it is appropriate to discount improvements in the future envi-
ronment at the environmental discount rate. Assuming environmental quality is falling, the preference to smooth consumption
between dates contributes negatively to the discount rate. That 𝜃 < 1 makes us less patient.
Especially the latter implication is perhaps surprising. One might have thought that the endowment effect would increase
the value placed on an investment on a path where environmental quality is being lost. But remember that the exercise here is
not to value the path itself, rather the discounting literature engages with the valuation of a marginal investment along a path.
What matters is that, on a strictly decreasing path, environmental quality is being lost not only in the future, it is being lost
today. If the marginal utility of losses today weighs more heavily on our welfare than the marginal utility of losses tomorrow,
the endowment effect makes us less willing to postpone consumption to the future. It must also be borne in mind that, of the
two elements of the endowment effect – reference dependence and loss aversion – only the former is at work on a strictly
increasing/decreasing path. Hence we become accustomed – habituated – to lower environmental quality, such that future
losses decrease our utility less.
Where loss aversion comes to the foreground is in valuing marginal investments along non-monotonic paths. Section 5.4
illustrated that the endowment effect on the discount rate can be very large along such paths, using the example of a non-
monotonic path of environmental quality. This is because loss aversion introduces a discontinuity or kink in the gain/loss utility
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function when the change in consumption of a good Δ = 0. On a non-monotonic path, which itself can be smooth as in our
example, there will be a point in time when growth hits zero on its way from positive to negative territory, and vice versa.
Around this point, the instantaneous endowment effect jumps, and the reference-updating effect changes rapidly in advance
of the jump. The chief implication is that valuation of environmental investments is likely to be substantially modiﬁed by the
endowment effect, when net beneﬁts are incurred in the region of a turning point in the growth of environmental quality. It is
clear, however, that the effect on valuations is context-speciﬁc.
Moving beyond a summary of our results to broader issues, there is naturally the question of whether the endowment effect
ought to be considered in evaluating public environmental investments in the ﬁrst place. There are at least two dimensions to
this. First, there is the question of how strong the evidence behind the endowment effect is. Second, there is the question of
whether preferences that represent the endowment effect should be afforded normative status, insofar as they are included in
public/social decision-making.
On the ﬁrst question, there is much empirical evidence that demonstrates the endowment effect in both laboratory and
ﬁeld settings (e.g. Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004; DellaVigna, 2009). This is not to deny the existence of dissenting evidence
though. Most famously, List (2003) showed that experienced traders of a good do not exhibit the endowment effect with respect
to that good, a result that is consistent either with those traders not being loss averse, or with those traders forming different
reference points to inexperienced traders (DellaVigna, 2009). However, the preferences of people who trade baseball cards at
least half a dozen times a month (i.e. an experienced trader) seem a poor analogy for those preferences of interest here, which
are over future levels of overall material consumption and environmental quality. Other dissenting evidence has suggested that
empirical regularities, which appear consistent with the endowment effect, are in fact due to other phenomena. For example,
Chetty and Szeidl (2016) argue that a model of household-level adjustment costs explains the same empirical patterns of house-
hold consumption as do models of habit formation, while explaining other regularities that habit-formation models cannot be
reconciled with.
On the second question, a simple application of the doctrine of consumer sovereignty would have it that, if the endowment
effect characterises people’s preferences, then the preferences of a social planner should include it too. However, objections can
be raised to this position. It might be argued that the endowment effect is irrational, even from the point of view of individual
consumer choice. Since the requirements of preferences are usually axioms or primitives, the yardstick of rationality is diﬃ-
cult to establish. Nonetheless one can ﬁnd comparable objections to affording normative status to related phenomena, such as
hyperbolic discounting (e.g. Hepburn et al., 2010) and ambiguity aversion (Al-Najjar and Weinstein, 2009; Gilboa et al., 2009).
With hyperbolic discounting, the concern is that preferences are time-inconsistent and therefore explain patterns of behaviour,
such as addiction and procrastination, which are not in the best interests of those who hold these preferences. However, it is
important to highlight that models of habit formation such as ours do not lead to time-inconsistency, even though the utility
function is not time-separable (Végh, 2013). A different objection might be based on the ethical implications of our results. In
the case of the environmental discount rate and falling environmental quality, 𝜃E < 1 implies that we should be less inclined
to improve the environment for future generations, because they are accustomed to poor environmental quality. This might
appear immoral. A related question, which is muchmore widely debated in the discounting literature, is to what extent features
of individual preferences should inform discount rates applied to decisions with intergenerational consequences.14 We feel that
a proposed resolution to this debate is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper. At the very least, our results indicate how
consumers who exhibit the endowment effect really do value future consumption. And if the endowment effect is judged not to
be a legitimate feature of the social planner’s preference, then there is a wedge between private and social discount rates that
may require policy intervention.
Lastly, there are several extensions to the present work, which are worthwhile considering. First, different options could be
pursued for modelling the endowment effect. For example, the formation of the reference level could be made a function of
past consumption-level utility, rather than past consumption. Among other things, this would permit low consumption in the
past to have a disproportionately high impact on the current reference level. By way of another example, the endowment effect
could be applied to only one of the two goods. Second, Appendix B points the way towards an analysis of optimal control of
pollution under the endowment effect. This will not be simple, however, given the large number of state variables implied by
having reference levels andmore than one good. Third, our results assume perfect foresight, a natural consequence of minimally
extending standard preferences. In fact, this is likely to have important implications for our results, because the strength of the
reference-updating effect rests on our anticipating the effect on future gain/loss utility of increments in consumption today. But
what if we don’t fully anticipate this effect, i.e. what if we succumb to projection bias? This would be worth looking into. Fourth,
we have only examined the endowment effect in a riskless choice setting, in the tradition of Tversky and Kahneman (1991),
even though reference dependence and loss aversion were ﬁrst invoked to explain risky choices (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
Therefore we could allow consumption of the two goods to follow a stochastic process. Again, this will not be wholly trivial,
because the state space of future consumption levels could span the kink in marginal gain/loss utility that is implied by loss
aversion. Under such circumstances, not only will there be familiar-looking results about the expectation of marginal gain/loss
utility that derive from application of Jensen’s inequality, there will also be a ‘kink effect’, so to speak.
14 For example, non-constant (possibly hyperbolic) discounting is less obviously irrational in an intergenerational context, where different time discount rates
might be applied within and across generations (Phelps and Pollak, 1968; Fujii and Karp, 2008; Ekeland and Lazrak, 2010).
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A. Derivation of the discount factor and rate
Following Karp and Traeger (2009), the functional derivative ̂J (x)with respect to a perturbation in the consumption path x̃ is
Ĵ
(
x; x̃
)
=
d
d𝜖
J
(
x + 𝜖x̃
)||||𝜖=0,
=
d
d𝜖 ∫
∞
0
e−ΔtU
[
xt + 𝜖x̃t , x
(
x + 𝜖x̃
)]
dt
||||𝜖=0.
Given utility function (2) and Eq. (3) describing the formation of the reference level,
Ĵ
(
x; x̃
)
=
d
d𝜖 ∫
∞
0
e−Δt
[
v(xt) + g
(
xt − xt
)
+
(
v′(xt) + gx
(
xt − xt
))
𝜖x̃t + gx
(
xt − xt
) (
x
t
(
x + 𝜖x̃
)
− x
t
(x)
)]
dt
||||𝜖=0.
In view of the fact that x
t
(
x + 𝜖x̃
)
− x
t
(x) = 𝛼 ∫ t−∞ e−𝛼(t−𝜏) (x𝜏 + 𝜖x̃𝜏 − x𝜏) d𝜏 ,
Ĵ
(
x; x̃
)
=
d
d𝜖 ∫
∞
0
e−Δt
[(
v′(xt) + gx
(
xt − xt
))
𝜖x̃t + gx
(
xt − xt
)(
𝛼 ∫
t
−∞
e−𝛼(t−𝜏)𝜖x̃𝜏d𝜏
)]
dt
|||||𝜖=0,
= ∫
∞
0
e−Δt
[(
v′(xt) + gx
(
xt − xt
))
x̃t + gx
(
xt − xt
)(
𝛼 ∫
∞
−∞
1𝜏≤te−𝛼(t−𝜏) x̃𝜏d𝜏
)]
dt.
Since gx
(
xt − xt
)
is independent of 𝜏 ,
Ĵ
(
x; x̃
)
= ∫
∞
0
e−Δt
(
v′(xt) + gx
(
xt − xt
))
x̃tdt + 𝛼 ∫
∞
0 ∫
∞
−∞
e−Δtgx
(
xt − xt
)
1𝜏≤te−𝛼(t−𝜏) x̃𝜏d𝜏dt,
Switching the order of integration of the second term gives
Ĵ
(
x; x̃
)
= ∫
∞
−∞
1t>0e
−Δt
(
v′(xt) + gx
(
xt − xt
))
x̃tdt + 𝛼 ∫
∞
−∞ ∫
∞
0
e−Δtgx
(
xt − xt
)
1𝜏≤te−𝛼(t−𝜏) x̃𝜏dtd𝜏.
Then switching t and 𝜏 in the second term allows us to write
Ĵ
(
x; x̃
)
= ∫
∞
−∞
[
1t>0e
−Δt
(
v′(xt) + gx
(
xt − xt
))
+ 𝛼 ∫
∞
0
e−Δ𝜏gx
(
x𝜏 − x𝜏
)
1𝜏≥te𝛼(t−𝜏)d𝜏
]
x̃tdt. (26)
Being a linear operator, the Fréchet derivative can also be written as the inner product of the consumption perturbation x̃ and a
density function Jx (x, t), which is deﬁned by the relationship
Ĵ
(
x; x̃
)
= ∫
∞
−∞
Jx (x, t) x̃dt. (27)
The density function Jx (x, t) is also known as the Volterra derivative. While the Fréchet derivative is a functional that takes in
two time paths as its arguments (i.e. x and x̃), the Volterra derivative has the time path x and date t as its arguments. The value
of the Volterra derivative at t can also be understood as the welfare effect of a marginal increase in the consumption path at t.
Therefore it can be written as Jx (x, t) =
̂J
(
x; Δt
)
, where the delta distribution Δt is deﬁned by ∫ ∞−∞ x̃𝜏Δ𝜏d𝜏 = x̃t ∀̃x ∈ x∞, i.e. a
functional that concentrates full weight on time t.
Combining (26) with (27) and considering only consumption perturbations after t = 0,
Jx (x, t) = e
−Δt
[
v′(xt) + gx
(
xt − xt
)]
+ 𝛼 ∫
∞
0
e−Δ𝜏gx
(
x𝜏 − x𝜏
)
1𝜏≥te𝛼(t−𝜏)d𝜏,
= e−Δt
[
v′(xt) + gx
(
xt − xt
)
+ 𝛼 ∫
∞
t
e−(𝛼+Δ)(𝜏−t)gx
(
x𝜏 − x𝜏
)
d𝜏
]
.
Since gx = −gx,
Jx (x, t) = e
−Δt
[
v′(xt) + g
′
(
xt − xt
)
− 𝛼 ∫
∞
t
e−(𝛼+Δ)(𝜏−t)g′
(
x𝜏 − x𝜏
)
d𝜏
]
. (28)
The discount factor for transferring a unit consumption from time 0 to t is
D ≡ Jxt
Jx0
. (29)
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Substituting (28) into (29) gives the expression for the discount factor in the main body of the paper, Eq. (5).
The corresponding discount rate at a given point in time is deﬁned as
r ≡ − d
dt
lnD(t, 0),
=
d
dt
Δt −
d
dt
ln
[
v′(xt) + g
′
(
xt − xt
)
− 𝛼 ∫
∞
𝜏=t
e−(𝛼+Δ)(𝜏−t)g′
(
x𝜏 − x𝜏
)
d𝜏
]
(30)
+
d
dt
[
v′(x0) + g
′
(
x0 − x0
)
− 𝛼 ∫
∞
𝜏=0
e−(𝛼+Δ)(𝜏−0)g′
(
x𝜏 − x𝜏
)
d𝜏
]
. (31)
The third term is independent of t. Using the chain rule to take the derivative of the second term we ﬁnd that
r = Δ −
v̇′ + ġ′ − 𝛼?̇?
v′ + g′ − 𝛼𝜇
.
B. Derivation of the discount rate from an optimal control problem
The purpose of this Appendix is to link the analysis of discount rates in arbitrary economies, which is the focus of the main
body of our paper, with discount rates in optimal economies. Suppose environmental quality is inversely related to the ﬂow
of pollution, S = − E. Following Brock (1973), we write production of the material good as a positive function of the ﬂow of
pollution. The production function is
Y = F (K, S) ,
where K is capital. We assume that FK > 0 and FKK < 0. For a given capital stock, production is also an increasing and strictly
concave function of the pollution intensity of the capital stock, i.e. FS > 0 and FSS < 0. Production is either consumed or re-
invested, so capital is accumulated according to
K̇ = F(K, S) − C,
where C is consumption and may be considered interchangeable with the generic consumption good x in Sections 2 and 3 of the
main paper. Population and the production technology are assumed to be constant for simplicity, and for the same reason we
omit capital depreciation.
The single-good setting
The single-good planning problem corresponding with this setting is
max
{C,S}
J = ∫
∞
0
e−Δt
[
v
(
Ct
)
+ g
(
Ct − Ct
)]
dt (32)
s.t. K̇ = F(K, S) − C, (33)
Ċ = 𝛼
(
C − C
)
, (34)
and initial K and C. The current value Hamiltonian is deﬁned as
 = v (C) + g (C − C) + 𝜇K [F(K, S) − C] + 𝜇C [𝛼 (C − C)] .
Notice that the costate variable on reference consumption of the material good 𝜇C = −𝜇 in Eq. (7).
Necessary conditions for a maximum include
𝜇K = v′ + g′ + 𝜇C𝛼, (35)
𝜇K
𝜇K
= Δ − FK , (36)
?̇?C
𝜇C
= Δ + 𝛼 + g
′
𝜇C
. (37)
The transversality conditions for K and 𝜇C are
lim
t→∞
e−Δt𝜇K = 0,
lim
t→∞
e−Δt𝜇C = 0. (38)
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Substituting (35) into (36) leads to an extended version of the standard Euler equation, which shows that in an optimal economy
the material discount rate in Eq. (6) must be equal to the marginal product of capital:
rC = FK = Δ −
v̇′ + ġ′ + 𝛼?̇?C
v′ + g′ + 𝛼𝜇C
= Δ −
v̇′ + ġ′ − 𝛼?̇?
v′ + g′ − 𝛼𝜇
.
Integrating (37) gives the general solution 𝜇C = ke(Δ+𝛼)t − ∫ ∞
t
e−(Δ+𝛼)(𝜏−t)g′d𝜏 . The transversality condition (38) imposes a
growth rate for the shadow price of reference consumption that is lower than 𝛿. Therefore k = 0 and we obtain the shadow
price of reference consumption as in (7).
The two-good setting
The two-good planning problem is
max
{C,S}
J = ∫
∞
0
e−Δt
[
v
(
Ct , Et
)
+ g
(
Ct − Ct
)
+ h
(
Et − Et
)]
dt
subject to (33), (34), Ė = 𝛼
(
E − E
)
and initial K, C and E. The current value Hamiltonian in this case is
 = v (C, E) + g (C − C) + h (E − E) + 𝜇K [F(K, S) − C] + 𝜇C [𝛼 (C − C)] + 𝜇E [𝛼 (E − E)] .
where 𝜇E = −𝜙 in Eq. (17). Necessary conditions for a maximum include (35)–(37),
𝜇KFS = vE + h
′ + 𝛼𝜇E and (39)
?̇?E
𝜇E
= Δ + 𝛼 + h
′
𝜇E
. (40)
Since we are dealing with a ﬂow pollutant, the current-valued shadow price of environmental quality is just − 𝜇KFS. Therefore
the environmental discount rate is
rE = Δ −
̇𝜇KFS
𝜇KFS
.
Combined with Eq. (39), this gives
rE = Δ −
v̇E + ḣ
′ + 𝛼?̇?E
vE + h
′ + 𝛼𝜇E
= Δ −
̇vE + ḣ′ − 𝛼?̇?
vE + h
′ − 𝛼𝜙
, (41)
which is equivalent to (18) with (19).
In the case of a stock pollutant, where Ė = − S − 𝜔E and 𝜔 is the decay rate of the pollutant in the environment, stock
pollution requires an additional costate equation,
?̇?E
𝜇E
= Δ + 𝜔 −
vE + h
′ + 𝜇E𝛼
𝜇E
, (42)
and Eq. (39) becomes just
𝜇E = 𝜇KFS. (43)
The appropriate discount rate to trade off a marginal unit of stock pollution over time is therefore deﬁned as
rE = Δ −
?̇?E
𝜇E
.
Combined with Eq. (43), this gives the following environmental discount rate:
rE = −𝜔 +
vE + h
′ + 𝜇E𝛼
𝜇E
,
which differs from Eq. (41), because it includes the fact that adding a unit of pollution at a given date will affect the quality of
the environment at future dates.
C. Interpreting k
Convex exponential paths
Suppose that consumption grows exponentially at rate j:
xt = xt0e
j(t−t0). (44)
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When j > 0 consumption is convex increasing; when j < 0 it is convex decreasing. Setting the current time to t0 and substi-
tuting Eq. (44) into the deﬁnition of the reference level yields
x
t
= 𝛼 ∫
t
−∞
e−𝛼(t−𝜏)xte
−j(t−𝜏)d𝜏 = 𝛼xt ∫
t
−∞
e−(𝛼+j)(t−𝜏)d𝜏. (45)
Let us ﬁrst consider j > − 𝛼. Given that 𝛼 ∈ [0, 1], this covers all convex increasing paths, and convex decreasing paths as
long as the rate of decrease is not too large. If j > − 𝛼, (45) simpliﬁes to
x
t
=
𝛼
j + 𝛼
xt, (46)
such that the current reference level is a ﬁxed proportion of current consumption and it exhibits the same exponential growth
as consumption:
xt − xt =
j
j + 𝛼
xt =
j
j + 𝛼
xt0e
j(t−t0)
⇒ j =
ẋt − ẋt
xt − xt
.
The elasticity of marginal gain/loss utility is
𝜂g
t
≡ −𝜕g′∕g′
𝜕Δ∕Δ
= −
g′′
g′
(Δ),
where as beforeΔ ≡ xt − xt . In Section 3 we used k to denote the rate of change of marginal gain/loss utility, therefore in general
kt = ġ
′∕g′. This immediately implies that
kt = −𝜂
g
t
j,
in other words the rate of change of marginal gain/loss utility at time t is the product of the negative of the elasticity of marginal
gain/loss utility and the consumption growth rate.
Section 3 speciﬁcally deals with paths that conform to constant k over the time period [t,∞). It turns out that if j > 0 and
the gain/loss function g exhibits constant elasticity on the domain [xt − xt;∞], then within the time interval [t,∞)we have the
special case of
k = −𝜂gj.
This is also true if − 𝛼 < j < 0, but only if g(.) exhibits constant elasticity on the domain
[
xt − xt;0
]
, which would imply
lim
Δ→0
g′(Δ) = ∞. In case this is felt to be undesirable, we might consider convex decreasing paths that are approximated by (44),
but where j̇ > 0 for t > T, with T being the time at which the loss enters the non-constant elasticity domain. Another option is
to assume that the reference-updating effect is not inﬁnitely forward-looking, rather it only extends to a ﬁnite date T far in the
future.
What about if j ≤ − 𝛼? From Eq. (45) we can see that x
t
= ∞. Since we ‘forget’ our past consumption levels at a slower
rate than consumption is falling, the reference level is determined by the inﬁnite consumption we once enjoyed on this strictly
decreasing path.
Concave exponential paths
Suppose instead that consumption evolves according to
xt = Υ − Υe
j(t−T). (47)
When j > 0, consumption is concave decreasing from a horizontal asymptote at x−∞ = Υ to xT = 0. On the whole path,
t − T < 0. When j < 0, consumption is concave increasing from xT = 0 and converges asymptotically to x∞ = Υ. On the
whole path, t − T > 0.
Consider j > 0. Substituting (47) into the deﬁnition of the reference level, this time we obtain
x
t
= 𝛼 ∫
t
−∞
e−𝛼(t−𝜏)(Υ − Υej(𝜏−T))d𝜏 = Υ − 𝛼
𝛼 + j
Υej(t−T), (48)
which again means that j =
(
ẋt − ẋt
)
∕
(
xt − xt
)
and so, if the gain/loss function is isoelastic on the domain ] − ∞;Ct − Ct],
k = − 𝜂gj.
Now consider −𝛼 < j < 0. The path begins at xT = 0, in which case
x
t
= 𝛼 ∫
t
T
e−𝛼(t−𝜏)(Υ − Υej(𝜏−T))d𝜏 = Υ(1 − e−𝛼(t−T)) − 𝛼
𝛼 + j
Υ(ej(t−T) − e−𝛼(t−T)).
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For t > > T this solution converges to Eq. (48), so again k = − 𝜂gj. However, this case requires that the gain/loss function is
isoelastic on the domain
[
0; xt − xt
]
, which encounters the same possible objection and proposed solutions as the case of convex
decreasing paths above.
There is no tractable relation between k and gwhen j ≤ − 𝛼 and consumption evolves according to (47).
D. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We begin by proving the endowment factor is given by (13). In the case of diminishing sensitivity, but where the
consumption path is decreasing arithmetically, xt = xt0 + 𝜅(t − t0), 𝜅 < 0 for any arbitrary date in the past t0 ∈ (−∞, t] and we
can write Eq. (15) as
x
t
= 𝛼 ∫
t0
−∞
e−𝛼(t−𝜏)x𝜏d𝜏 + 𝛼 ∫
t
t0
e−𝛼(t−𝜏)[xt0 + 𝜅(𝜏 − t0)]d𝜏,
= 𝛼 ∫
t0
−∞
e−𝛼(t−𝜏)x𝜏d𝜏 + 𝛼e
−𝛼t ∫
t
t0
e𝛼𝜏xt0d𝜏 + 𝛼𝜅e
−𝛼t ∫
t
t0
e𝛼𝜏 (𝜏 − t0)d𝜏,
= 𝛼 ∫
t0
−∞
e−𝛼(t−𝜏)x𝜏d𝜏 + xt0(1 − e
−𝛼(t−t0)) + 𝜅(t − t0) −
𝜅
𝛼
+
𝜅
𝛼
e−𝛼(t−t0). (49)
Taking the limit as t0 goes to minus inﬁnity we obtain
lim
t0→−∞
x
t
= xt0 + 𝜅(t − t0) −
𝜅
𝛼
= xt −
𝜅
𝛼
.
Therefore g
(
xt − xt
)
= g
(
𝜅
𝛼
)
, which is constant over time. If consumption follows an arithmetically increasing path instead, t0
is taken to be the time when consumption was zero, xt0 = 0. This eliminates the ﬁrst two terms in Eq. (49). Since we cannot take
the limit as t0 goes tominus inﬁnity, we approximate the same result if t0 is suﬃciently far in the past: xt ≈ xt0 + 𝜅(t − t0) −
𝜅
𝛼
. In
this case g
(
x − x
t
)
= g
(
𝜅
𝛼
)
too. Therefore on a linear path the instantaneous endowment effect g′ is constant, which alsomeans
that ġ′ = 0. This is self-evidently true if preferences obey constant sensitivity, as long as consumption is strictly increasing or
decreasing, in other words the increase/decrease need not be linear. Either way, since g′ is constant over time, the reference-
updating effect
𝛼 ∫
∞
t
e−(𝛼+Δ)(𝜏−t)g′d𝜏 = 𝛼g′
[
e−(𝛼+Δ)(𝜏−t)
−𝛼 −Δ
]∞
t
=
𝛼
𝛼 + Δ
g′.
Substituting this result into (19) results in Eq. (13). From (13), it is clear that 𝛿 > 0 is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for
0 < 𝜃 < 1.
E. 𝜃 in the long run
This Appendix develops insights into the long-run behaviour of the discount rate under the endowment effect.
Constant marginal gain/loss utility
On an arithmetically increasing consumption path, or on any strictly increasing consumption path with constant sensitivity,
it is clear from Eq. (13) that lim
t→∞
v′ = 0, 𝜃 = 0 and r = 𝛿. On such paths, marginal consumption-level utility falls over time,
while the marginal endowment effect is constant. As we get more and more aﬄuent, absolute levels of consumption matter
less and less, but gains from the reference level remain a source of utility. Eventually the (undiscounted) marginal contribution
of an extra unit of consumption is constant over time, so we discount at the pure time preference rate. Although this is also
the case on an arithmetically increasing consumption path without the endowment effect, the endowment effect speeds up the
convergence process (per Eq. (12), v̇′∕
[
v′ + Δg′∕ (𝛼 + Δ)
]
converges to zero faster than v̇′∕v′).
Conversely on an arithmetically decreasing consumption path, or a strictly decreasing consumption path with constant sen-
sitivity, lim
t→∞
v′ = ∞, 𝜃 = 1 and r = Δ − v̇′∕v′. On such paths, marginal consumption-level utility increases over time and even-
tually dominates the constant marginal endowment effect.15
Convex paths
Suppose like Appendix C that consumption grows at a constant rate j, such that xt = x0e
jt , and that the gain/loss utility
function has a constant elasticity 𝜂g . Then k = − 𝜂gj, with g′
t
= g0e
(−𝜂g jt). Suppose that the consumption-level utility function
15 On an arithmetically decreasing consumption path, there will of course be a point atwhich consumption is zero andwewould normally restrict consumption
to be non-negative. Still, for the class of strictly concave consumption-level utility functions, it is true that, as consumption approaches zero in ﬁnite time,
marginal consumption-level utility is arbitrarily large.
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also has a constant elasticity, denoted 𝜂 as in Eq. (8). Then v̇′∕v′ = −𝜂j, with v′
t
= v0e
(−𝜂jt). Substituting these into (11) allows us
to describe 𝜃 as an explicit function of time,
𝜃 =
1 +
(
Δ−k
𝛼+Δ−k
)
g0
v0
e(−𝜂
g+𝜂)jt 𝜂g
𝜂
1 +
(
Δ−k
𝛼+Δ−k
)
g0
v0
e(−𝜂
g+𝜂)jt
.
Consider convex increasing paths, where j > 0. When the elasticity of the gain/loss function is smaller than the elasticity of
the consumption-level utility function, 𝜂g < 𝜂, the second term grows over time, both in the numerator and the denominator,
such that lim
t→∞
𝜃 = 𝜂g∕𝜂, the marginal endowment effect dominates in the long run and we discount at r = 𝛿 + 𝜂gj. Empirical
evidence might point to the relevance of this case, as discussed in Section 5. It corresponds to the region between k = v̇′∕v′ and
k = 0 in Fig. 1.
Conversely when 𝜂g > 𝜂, lim
t→∞
𝜃 = 1, marginal consumption-level utility dominates in the long run and we discount at the
standard rate. Both marginal consumption-level utility and themarginal endowment effect decrease over time, but themarginal
endowment effect decreases faster (as can be seen in Eq. (12)). This corresponds to the region left of the point k = v̇′∕v′ on the
horizontal axis in Fig. 1.
On convex decreasing paths, constant 𝜂g would give rise to inﬁnite marginal gain/loss utility at the reference point, which
may be argued to be an undesirable property. If, however, we constrain marginal gain/loss utility to be constant for very small
gains/losses, then on a convex decreasing consumption path we have another case where lim
t→∞
𝜃 = 1 and r = Δ − v̇′∕v′. In the
numerical analysis of Section 5, we bound marginal gain/loss utility at zero as the gain/loss approaches zero in the limit.
Concave paths
Assume like Appendix C that x evolves according to xt = Υ − Υe
j(t−T). Then the growth rate is ẋ∕x = j∕
[
1 − e−j(t−T)
]
. Assum-
ing an iso-elastic consumption-level utility function, we have
v̇′∕v′ = −𝜂 ẋ
x
=
𝜂j
e−j(t−T) − 1
.
Integrating this gives
v′
t
= v0
(
ej(t−T) − 1
ejT − 1
)−𝜂
.
Substituting these two equations into (11) gives
𝜃 =
1 +
(
Δ−k
𝛼+Δ−k
)
g′
v′
−𝜂g
(
e−j(t−T)−1
)
𝜂
1 +
(
Δ−k
𝛼+Δ−k
)
g′
v′
,
with
g′
v′
=
g′
0
e−𝜂
g jt
v′
0
[
ej(t−T) − 1
ejT − 1
]𝜂
.
For j < 0, the path is concave increasing, x is zero at time T and evolves to a steady state x = Υ. We have
lim
t→∞
𝜃 = ∞ if Δ − k
𝛼 + Δ − k
< 0,
lim
t→∞
𝜃 = −∞ if Δ − k
𝛼 + Δ − k
> 0.
Note that if marginal gain/loss utility is constrained to be constant for very small gains/losses, then on a concave increasing path
we have another case where lim
t→∞
𝜃 = 0 and r = 𝛿.
For j > 0, the path is concave decreasing, reaching zero at time T. For t = T, we have 𝜃 = 1. g′ decreases over time, while v′
increases. The shadow price of the reference point is deﬁned with respect to the indeﬁnite future. Therefore the result is based
on the assumption that the path further declines (in negative territory) after t = T. If the path is instead characterised by x = 0
after T, the formula for 𝜃 will be a bad approximation when t approaches T. In the limit, we are back in the constant marginal
gain/loss utility case.
F. Asymptotic behaviour of 𝜃
Equation (11) can also be written in the following way:
𝜃 =
𝛼 + Δ − k + g
′
v̇′
k(Δ − k)
𝛼 +Δ − k + g
′
v′
(Δ − k)
.
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To understand the sign of the denominator, consider 𝜃 in the neighbourhood of the vertical asymptote at k = Δ + 𝛼
1+g′∕v′
+ 𝜖
with arbitrarily small 𝜖. Substituting this value of k into the denominator gives
𝛼 − 𝛼
1 +
g′
v′
− 𝜖 − g
′
v̇′
(
𝛼
1 +
g′
v′
+ 𝜖
)
= −𝜖 − g
′
v′
𝜖.
The denominator will therefore be positive to the left of the asymptote and negative to the right of it.
The numerator is positive in the neighbourhood of the asymptote at k = Δ +
𝛼
1+g′∕v′
if
𝛼 − 𝛼
1 +
g′
v′
+
g′
v′
(
Δ +
𝛼
1 +
g′
v′
)(
−𝛼
1 +
g′
v′
)
> 0
⇔
v′
v̇′
(
Δ +
𝛼
1 +
g′
v′
)
< 1.
Therefore the numerator is positive if
v̇′
v′
< 0 or v̇
′
v′
> Δ + 𝛼
1+
g′
v′
. As a result, 𝜃 jumps from inﬁnity to minus inﬁnity as k increases
beyond the asymptote. On the contrary, the numerator is negative if 0 < v̇
′
v′
< Δ + 𝛼
1+
g′
v′
, with the result that 𝜃 jumps fromminus
inﬁnity to inﬁnity as k passes the asymptote.
G. Sensitivity analysis
Single-good setting
Fig. 7 analyses the sensitivity of 𝜃C in Section 5.2 to variation in the preference parameters at a maturity of 50 years, a
typical horizon for a long-run environmental project. The gain/loss parameters 𝛼, 𝛽andZ are varied over their entire possi-
ble ranges, while Δ ∈ [0.001, 0.02] and 𝜓 ∈ [0.5, 4]. The value of 𝜃C that corresponds with the default parameter settings is
0.22 at t = 50. The material endowment factor is most sensitive to Z, the initial value share of consumption-level utility, fol-
lowed by 𝛽 , the parameter determining the curvature of the gain/loss function, the memory parameter 𝛼 and the elasticity of
marginal consumption-level utility 𝜓 . The material endowment factor is insensitive to the rate of pure time preference 𝛿. If
Z = 0 so that preferences only depend on gains and losses, 𝜃C = 0.07 at t = 50, and the discount rate is close to the pure rate
of time preference.16 Observe that 0 < 𝜃C < 1 for all values of𝜓 that we investigated, despite the fact that 𝜓 bears upon ̇vC∕vC ,
which we know to be important in the case of convex increasing consumption.
Fig. 7. Sensitivity of 𝜃C to parameters at t = 50.
16 Recall Z is the initial value share of consumption-level utility, so by t = 50 the contemporaneous value share of consumption-level utility has increased
slightly.
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Two-good setting
Fig. 8 analyses the sensitivity of 𝜃E in Section 5.3 to preference parameters at t = 50. The range of elasticity of substitution
between the two goods is 𝜎 ∈ [0.04, 100], running from approximately perfect substitutes to perfect complements, while the
loss aversion parameter 𝜆 ∈ [1, 5]. In the two-good setting, not all values of Z are feasible when Γ = 0.9 and conversely not all
values of Γ are feasible when Z = 0.75. For this analysis Z ∈ [0.6, 1] and Γ ∈ [0.8, 1). The endowment factor is most sensitive to
the elasticity of substitution between consumption and environmental quality, 𝜎, followed by Z, even over its limited range in
this case.
Fig. 8. Sensitivity of 𝜃E to parameters at t = 50.
H. Further analysis of a non-monotonic path for environmental quality
As well as rEstd. and the default parameterisation of rE endow. (𝜆 = 2.25;𝛽 = 0.9), we aid interpretation of the results in
Section 5.4 by providing additional plots of rE endow., which are generated by omitting loss aversion (𝜆 = 1) and/or assuming
constant sensitivity (𝛽 = 1).
In the absence of loss aversion (𝜆 = 1), there is no large jump in the discount rate. Under diminishing sensitivity but without
loss aversion – in other words when the marginal gain/loss function is a smooth sigmoid – there is a trough in the discount
rate around the turning point in environmental quality, just because marginal gain/loss utility becomes large when the change
in environmental quality is small. Moreover the discount rate only appears discontinuous due to the effect of the bounding
parameter 𝜔. As one would expect, when neither loss aversion nor diminishing sensitivity is present (𝜆 = 1;𝛽 = 1), so that
the marginal gain/loss function is linear, the discount rate does not deviate from a declining path.
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Fig. 9. Additional plots of rEendow. on a non-monotonic path of E, varying 𝜆 and 𝛽 .
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2019.01.010.
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